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Decision theory is the model of individual human behavior employed by neoclassical economics.
Built on this model of individual behavior are models of aggregate behavior that feed into models of
macroeconomics and inform economic policy. Neoclassical economics has been fiercely criticized for
failing to make meaningful predictions of individual and aggregate behavior, and as a consequence
has been accused of misguiding economic policy. We identify as the Achilles heel of the formalism
its least constrained component, namely the concept of utility. This concept was introduced as
an additional degree of freedom in the 18th century when it was noticed that previous models of
decision-making failed in many realistic situations. At the time, only pre-18th century mathematics
was available, and a fundamental solution of the problems was impossible. We re-visit the basic
problem and resolve it using modern techniques, developed in the late 19th and throughout the
20th century. From this perspective utility functions do not appear as (irrational) psychological re-
weightings of monetary amounts but as non-linear transformations that define ergodic observables
on non-ergodic growth processes. As a consequence we are able to interpret different utility functions
as encoding different non-ergodic dynamics and remove the element of human irrationality from the
explanation of basic economic behavior. Special cases were treated in [1]. Here we develop the
theory for general utility functions.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Ey,05.10.Gg,05.20.Gg,05.40.Jc
The first three sections are concerned with putting this
work in context, and a brief summary of relevant aspects
expected utility theory. The novel technical part starts
in Section IV.
I. POSITIONING
The present document is concerned with decision the-
ory, part of the foundation of formal economics. It is
therefore worth our while to spell out where in this vast
context we feel our contribution is located. It addresses
the most formal part of economics, something that is
often called neoclassical economics. Broadly speaking
this is the part of economics that builds simple quantita-
tive models of economic processes, analyzes these models
mathematically, and interprets their behavior by giving
real-world meaning to model variables.
This approach to thinking about economic issues be-
came particularly dominant in the second half of the 20th
century. Soon after the rise of its popularity it began to
be fiercely criticized. We take these criticisms very seri-
ously and interpret them as an indication that something
is fundamentally wrong in the way we conceptualize eco-
nomic problems in the neoclassical approach.
It is certainly true that some of the predictions of neo-
classical economics clash with observations. Paradoxes,
that is, apparent internal inconsistencies stubbornly re-
main in the field (examples are the St. Petersburg para-
dox or the Equity Premium Puzzle). This situation may
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elicit different responses, for example
1. we can think of it as a normal part of science in
progress. Of course there are unresolved problems
– finding their solutions is the job of the economic
researcher.
2. we may conclude that the pen-and-paper approach
using models simple enough for analytical solution
makes the representation of people too simplistic.
Instead of analyzing such models, it has been ar-
gued, we should turn to numerical work and build
in-silico worlds of agents with more complex, more
realistic behaviour.
3. we may reject the entire scientific approach,
whether analytic or numerical. Proponents of this
position argue that economic questions are funda-
mentally moral, not scientific, and that a scientific
approach is bound to miss the most important as-
pects of the problem.
We consider all three responses valid but not mutually
exclusive. Every discipline has open problems, and it
would be foolish to dismiss an approach only because it
has not resolved every problem it encountered. Turning
to computer simulations is part of every scientific disci-
pline – when simple models fail and more complex mod-
els are not analytically tractable, of course we should use
computers. Nor can we dismiss the argument that build-
ing a good society entails more than building an economi-
cally wealthy society, and that mathematical models only
elucidate the consequences of a set of axioms but cannot
prove the validity, let alone the moral validity, of the ax-
ioms themselves.
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2The treatment we present here is most informative
with respect to perspective 1. We agree with the neoclas-
sical approach in the following sense: we believe that sim-
ple mathematical models can yield meaningful insights.
We ask precisely how the failures of neoclassical eco-
nomics may be interpreted as a flaw in the formalism that
can be corrected. Such a flaw indeed exists, buried deep
in the foundations of formal economics: often expectation
values are taken where time averages would be appropri-
ate. In this sense, formal economics has missed perhaps
the most important property of decisions: they are made
in time and affect the future. They are not made in the
context of co-existing possibilities across which resources
may be shared. We find reflections of this missing el-
ement, for instance in the criticism of “short termism”
that is often levelled against neo-classical economics. In-
deed, an approach that disregards time in this precise
way will result in a formalism that is overly focused on
the short term. For example, such a formalism will not
provide an understanding of the fundamental benefits of
cooperation [2].
We are led by this analysis to a correction of the for-
malism capable of resolving a number of very persistent
problems. The work in the present paper is part of im-
plementing the correction. It also helps clarify the rela-
tionship between existing work in neo-classical economics
and our own work. Overall, we propose to re-visit and
re-develop the entire formalism from a more nuanced ba-
sis that gives the concept of time the central importance
it must have if the formalism is to be of use to humans
and collections of humans whose existence is inescapably
subject to time.
II. EPISTEMOLOGY
We begin with some remarks on rationality. Economics
is the only science that frequently states that it assumes
rational behavior. The comparison with physics is illu-
minating.
1 a A strong though rarely articulated assumption
in physics is that observed behavior can be ex-
plained, in the sense that it follows rules, laws,
or tendencies that – once identified – enable
us to predict and comprehend the behavior of
a given system. This assumption is a funda-
mental belief. It is assumed that the world,
or rather very little isolated bits of the world,
can be understood. Without this assumption
it would not be sensible to try to understand
the behavior of physical systems.
b When we say that we assume rational behav-
ior in economics, as we do, we mean nothing
else. We assume that observed behavior can
be explained, in the sense that it follows rules,
laws, or tendencies that – once identified – en-
able us to predict and comprehend human be-
havior.
2 a In physics we proceed by specifying a model of
the observed behavior, that is, a mathematical
analog, our guess of the rules governing the
physical system. For instance, we might say
that electrons are point particles with mass
9.1 × 10−31 kg that repel one another with
1/r2 Coulomb force.
b Similarly, in economics we proceed by speci-
fying our model of human behavior. For in-
stance, we might say that humans choose the
action that maximizes the expectation value
of their monetary wealth.
3 a We now confront our model with observations.
No observation will be exactly as predicted by
the model. No two electrons will be observed
to repel each other with 1/r2 Coulomb force.
There are too many other electrons around,
and protons and gravity and countless per-
turbations. Nonetheless, the model is useful
because it makes more or less sensible pre-
dictions of large groups of electrons. The be-
havior of a billion billion billion electrons over
here and a billion billion billion electrons over
there may be well described as the behavior
of many electrons repelling each other with
1/r2 Coulomb force. But we may find a realm
where the electrons behave irrationally. For
instance, a lump of 9.1 × 10−31 kg of matter
should be able to absorb any amount of en-
ergy. But as it turns out, electrons bound to
a nucleus only accept certain fixed amounts of
energy. This presents a dilemma to the physi-
cist. He now has a choice between i) declar-
ing electrons as behaving irrationally, i.e. giv-
ing up the search for an explanation, and ii)
declaring his model as deficient in the regime
of interest and search for another model. Of-
ten a pretty good mathematical description of
the irrational behavior is easily found but is
perceived as a mathematical trick, just a de-
scription with no inherent meaning [18]. Some
years or centuries later an intuition evolves in
a new context, and the previously purely for-
mal model (the mathematical trick) now ap-
pears as a natural part of a bigger picture.
b Similarly, observations of human behavior will
not be exactly as predicted. There are too
many idiosynchratic and circumstantial fac-
tors involved. No single person will be ob-
served to maximize the expectation value of
his wealth consistently. Nonetheless, an over-
all tendency may be predictable – a major-
ity of people may prefer a 50/50 chance of
receiving $2 or losing $1 over no change in
their wealth. But we may find a realm where
3people behave consistently irrationally. Per-
haps few people will prefer a 50/50 chance
of winning $20,000 or losing $10,000 over no
change in their wealth. Again, the scientist
has a choice between i) giving up the funda-
mental belief that made him a scientist in the
first place and declaring humans to be irra-
tional, and ii) declaring his model deficient in
the new regime and look for a better model.
In the example we mentioned, a new model
was quickly found in the early 18th century.
While human behavior is not well described as
maximizing the expectation value of wealth, it
is quite well described as maximizing the ex-
pectation value of changes in the logarithm of
wealth. Where the logarithm comes from is
unclear – the psychological label “risk aver-
sion” is attached to it but that’s just a label.
In essence, this is a mathematical trick that
seems to work well, just as Planck’s trick of
quantizing energy worked well. Following the
development of quantum mechanics, Planck’s
trick doesn’t seem so strange any more. An
intuition has arisen around it. The story of
this paper is the story of the equivalent de-
velopment in decision theory. Following the
formulation of the concept of ergodicity, the
logarithm – the mathematical trick that saved
decision theory – does not seem so strange
any more. We identify the use of the loga-
rithm as a different model of rationality: it is
rational to maximize average wealth growth
over time under the null model of multiplica-
tive growth; it is not rational to maximize the
mathematical expectation of wealth. The two
models give similar predictions for small mon-
etary amounts, but entirely different predic-
tions when the amounts involved approach the
scale of total disposable wealth. Maximizing
the rate of change of the logarithm of wealth
now appears as a natural part of a bigger pic-
ture.
Firstly, we make the methodological choice to assume
that human behavior can be understood in principle.
This is sometimes called the rationality hypothesis.
Secondly, we postulate a specific form of rationality,
that is, we state an axiom. Our axiom is that humans
make decisions in a manner that would optimise the time-
average growth rate of wealth, were those decisions to
be repeated indefinitely. In our treatment, decisions are
choices between different stochastic processes, not choices
between different random variables as is usually the case
in decision theory.
Just as the description of electrons as charged point
masses is not a good description in all contexts, our treat-
ment is not a good description of economic decisions in
all contexts. For example, we expect our axiom to be a
poor representation of reality if relevant time scales are
short. Of course “short” is a relative term that depends
on the stochastic process. Time scales are short if a typ-
ical trajectory is dominated by noise. In this regime the
underlying tendencies of an individual’s decisions have
no time to emerge, and are subsumed by randomness.
Having pointed out the descriptive limits of our trea-
ment, we add that our theory is not normative either.
We simply point out the logical and mathematical con-
nections between our treatment and classsical decision
theory.
III. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY
Expected utility theory is the bedrock of neoclassical
economics. It provides the discipline’s answer to the fun-
damental decision problem of how to choose between dif-
ferent sets of uncertain outcomes. The generality of the
framework is all-encompassing. Everything in the past
is certain, whereas everything in the future comes with
a degree of uncertainty. Any decision is about choosing
one uncertain future over alternative uncertain futures,
wherefore expected utility theory is behind the answer of
neoclassical economics to any problem involving human
decision making.
To keep the discussion manageable, we restrict it to
financial decisions, i.e. we will not consider the utility of
an apple or of a poem but only utility differences between
different dollar amounts. We restrict ourselves to situa-
tions where any non-financial attendant circumstances of
the decision can be disregarded. In other words we work
with a form of homo economicus.
For a decision maker facing a choice between different
courses of action, the workflow of expected utility theory
is as follows
1. Imagine everything that could happen under the
different actions:
Associate with any action A,B,C... a set of possible
future events ΩA, ΩB, ΩC ...
2. Estimate how likely the different consequences of
each action are and how they would affect your
wealth:
For set ΩA, associate a probability p(ωA) and a
change in wealth ∆wωAwith each elementary event
ωA ∈ ΩA, and similarly for all other sets.
3. Specify how much these outcomes would affect your
happiness:
Define a utility function, u(w), that only depends
on wealth and describes the decision maker’s risk
preferences.
4. Aggregate the possible changes of happiness for any
given event:
Compute the expected changes in utility asso-
ciated with each available action, 〈∆uA〉 =∑
ΩA
p(ωA)u(w + ∆w(ωA)) − u(w), and similarly
for actions B,C...
45. Pick the action that makes you happiest:
The option with the highest expected utility change
is the decision maker’s best choice.
Each step of this process has been criticized, but we
assume that all steps are possible. This does not re-
flect a personal opinion that they are unproblematic in
reality but is a methodological choice. By overlooking
some undeniable but possibly solvable difficulties we are
able to inspect and question aspects at a deeper level of
the formalism. Thus we assume that all possible future
events, associated probabilities and changes in wealth are
known, that a suitable utility function is available, and
that the mathematical expectation of utility changes is
the mathematical object whose ordering reflects prefer-
ences among actions. For simplicity we also make the
common assumption that the time between taking an ac-
tion and experiencing the corresponding change in wealth
is independent of the action taken.
Having accepted the basic premises of expected utility
theory we acknowledge a remaining criticism. Expected
utility theory may not be useful in practice. Of course
usefulness can only be assessed if we know what we want
to achieve. One aim of decision theory may be to gen-
uinely help real people make decisions. On this score ex-
pected utility theory is limited. It is designed to ensure
consistency in an individual’s choices, but judged against
criteria other than the risk preferences of the individual
the theory may produce consistently bad choices. For
example, decision theory is not designed to find the deci-
sions that lead to the fastest growth in wealth; the deci-
sions it recommends are those that maximize the math-
ematical expectation of a model of the decision maker’s
happiness. For a gambling addict, for instance, these de-
cisions may lead to bankruptcy. Expected utility theory
will recognize the individual as addicted to gambling, and
conclude that he will be happiest behaving recklessly. It
is a laissez-faire approach to decision theory. Such an
approach is not illegitimate, however its limitations must
be borne in mind. For instance, when designing policy
it is no use to recognize that a financial institution that
takes larger risks than are good for systemic stability is
happiest when doing so. For any given decision maker
it requires a utility function that can only be estimated
by querying the decision maker, possibly about simpler
choices that we believe he can assess more easily. Pref-
erences of the decision maker are thus an input to the
formalism. The output of the formalism is also a prefer-
ence, namely the action that makes the decision maker
the happiest. In other words, the output is of the same
type as the input, which makes the framework circular.
It may help the decision maker by telling him which ac-
tion is most consistent with other actions he has taken
or knows he would take in other situations.
We will interpret the basic findings of expected utility
theory in a different light. We will remove the circularity,
for better or worse, and using our model of rational be-
havior show that rationality according to our axioms un-
der a reasonable model of wealth dynamics is equivalent
to expected utility theory with commonly used utility
functions. Some researchers consider this an irrelevant
contribution because in that case we might just continue
using expected utility theory. We disagree and consider
our contribution an important step forward because it
motivates new questions and provides answers that are
not circular.
The range of questions we can answer in this way is
surprising to us. Examples are: how does an investor
choose the leverage of an investment [3]? How can we
resolve the St. Petersburg paradox [4]? How can we
resolve the equity premium puzzle [5]? Why do people
choose to cooperate [2]? Why do insurance contracts
exist [6]? How can we make sense of the recent changes in
observed economic inequality [7]? Do economic systems
change from one phase to another under different tax
regimes?
We have variously referred to our approach as “dynam-
ical” or “time-based” or as recognizing disequilibrium or
non-ergodicity. The best term to refer to our perspective
may be “ergodicity economics” – in every problem we
have treated we have asked whether the expectation val-
ues of key variables were meaningful, in particular how
they were related to time averages.
IV. TECHNICAL
We repeat our two axioms.
1. Human behavior can be understood. It follows
a rationale and is in that sense rational.
2. We explore the following model of this ratio-
nale. Humans make decisions so that the growth
rate of their wealth would be maximized over time
were those decisions repeated indefinitely.
We suppose that an individual’s wealth evolves over
time according to a stochastic process. This is a de-
parture from classical decision theory, where wealth is
supposed to be described by a random variable without
dynamic. To turn a gamble into a stochastic process and
enable the techniques we have developed, a dynamic must
be assumed, that is, a mode of repetition of the gamble,
see [1].
The individual is required to choose one from a set of
alternative stochastic processes, say x(t) and x∗(t). We
suppose that this is done by considering how the decision
maker would fare in their long-time limits.
At each decision time, t0, our individual acts to max-
imise subsequent changes in his wealth by selecting x(t)
so that if he waits long enough his wealth will be greater
under the chosen process than under the alternative pro-
cess with certainty. Mathematically speaking, there ex-
ists a sufficiently large t such that the probability of the
chosen x(t) being greater than x∗(t) is arbitrarily close
5to one,
∀ε, x∗(t) ∃∆t s.t. P(∆x > ∆x∗) > 1− , (1)
where 0 < ε < 1 and
∆x ≡ x(t0 + ∆t)− x(t0), (2)
with ∆x∗ similarly defined.
The criterion is necessarily probabilistic since the
quantities ∆x and ∆x∗ are random variables and it might
be possible for the latter to exceed the former for any fi-
nite ∆t. Only in the limit ∆t→∞ does the randomness
vanish from the system.
Conceptually this criterion is tantamount to maximis-
ing lim∆t→∞{∆x} or, equivalently, lim∆t→∞{∆x/∆t}.
However, neither limit is guaranteed to exist. For exam-
ple, consider a choice between two geometric Brownian
motions,
dx = x(µdt+ σdW ), (3)
dx∗ = x∗(µ∗dt+ σ∗dW ), (4)
with µ > σ2/2 and µ∗ > σ∗2/2. The quantities ∆x/∆t
and ∆x∗/∆t both diverge in the limit ∆t → ∞ and a
criterion requiring the larger to be selected fails to yield
a decision.
To overcome this problem we introduce a montonically
increasing function of wealth, which we call suggestively
u(x). We define:
∆u ≡ u(x(t0 + ∆t))− u(x(t0)); (5)
∆u∗ ≡ u(x∗(t0 + ∆t))− u(x∗(t0)). (6)
The monotonicity of u(x) means that the events ∆x >
∆x∗ and ∆u > ∆u∗ are the same. Taking ∆t > 0 allows
this event to be expressed as ∆u/∆t > ∆u∗/∆t, whence
the decision criterion in (Eq. 1) becomes
∀ε, x∗(t) ∃∆t s.t. P
(
∆u
∆t
>
∆u∗
∆t
)
> 1− . (7)
Our decision criterion has been recast such that it fo-
cuses on the rate of change
r ≡ ∆u
∆t
, (8)
As before, it is conceptually similar to maximising
r¯ ≡ lim
∆t→∞
{
∆u
∆t
}
= lim
∆t→∞
{r}. (9)
If x(t) satisfies certain conditions, to be discussed be-
low, then the function u(x) can be chosen such that this
limit exists. We shall see that r¯ is then the time-average
growth rate mentioned in Section II. For the moment we
leave our criterion in the probabilistic form of (Eq. 7)
but to continue the discussion we assume that the limit
(Eq. 9) exists.
Everything is now set up to make the link to expected
utility theory. Perhaps (Eq. 9) is the same as the rate of
change of the expectation value of ∆u
〈∆u〉
∆t
= 〈r〉 . (10)
We could then make the identification of u(x) being the
utility function, noting that our criterion is equivalent to
maximizing the rate of change in expected utility. We
note ∆u and hence r are random variables but 〈r〉 is not.
Taking the long-time limit is one way of removing ran-
domness from the problem, and taking the expectation
value is another. The expectation value is simply another
limit: it’s an average over N realizations of the random
number ∆u, in the limit N →∞. The effect of removing
randomness is that the process x(t) is collapsed into the
scalar ∆u, and consistent transitive decisions are possible
by ranking the relevant scalars. In general, maximising
〈r〉 does not yield the same decisions as the criterion es-
poused in (Eq. 7). This is only the case for a particular
function u(x) whose shape depends on the process x(t).
Our aim is to find these pairs of processes and functions.
When using such u(x) as the utility function, expected
utility theory will be consistent with optimisation over
time. It is then possible to interpret observed behav-
ior that is found to be consistent with expected utility
theory using the utility function u(x) in purely dynami-
cal terms: such behavior will lead to the fastest possible
wealth growth over time.
We ask what sort of dynamic u must follow so that r¯ =
〈r〉 or, put another way, so that r is an ergodic observable,
in the sense that its time and ensemble averages are the
same [8, p. 32].
We start by expressing the change in utility, ∆u, as a
sum over M equal time intervals,
∆u ≡ u(t0 + ∆t)− u(t0) (11)
=
M∑
m=1
[u(t0 +mδt)− u(t0 + (m− 1)δt)] (12)
=
M∑
m=1
δum(t), (13)
where δt ≡ ∆t/M and δum(t) ≡ u(t0 + mδt) − u(t0 +
(m− 1)δt). From (Eq. 9) we have
r¯ = lim
∆t→∞
{
1
∆t
M∑
m=1
δum
}
(14)
= lim
M→∞
{
1
M
M∑
m=1
δum
δt
}
, (15)
keeping δt fixed. From (Eq. 10) we obtain
〈r〉 = lim
N→∞
{
1
N
N∑
n=1
∆un
∆t
}
(16)
6where each ∆un is drawn independently from the distri-
bution of ∆u.
We now compare the two expressions (Eq. 15) and
(Eq. 16). Clearly the value of r¯ in (Eq. 15) cannot depend
on the way in which the diverging time period is parti-
tioned, so the length of interval δt must be arbitrary and
can be set to the value of ∆t in (Eq. 16), for consistency
we then call δum(t) = ∆um(t). Expressions (Eq. 15) and
(Eq. 16) are equivalent if the successive additive incre-
ments, ∆um(t), are distributed identically to the ∆un
in (Eq. 16), which requires only that they are stationary
and independent.
Thus we have a condition on u(t) which suffices to
make r¯ = 〈r〉, namely that it be a stochastic process
whose additive increments are stationary and indepen-
dent. This means that u(t) is, in general, a Le´vy process.
Without loss of realism we shall restrict our attention to
processes with continuous paths. According to a theo-
rem stated in [9, p. 2] and proved in [10, Chapter 12] this
means that u(t) must be a Brownian motion with drift,
du = audt+ budW, (17)
where dW is the infinitesimal increment of the Wiener
process.
By arguing backwards we can address concerns regard-
ing the existence of r¯. If u follows the dynamics specified
by (Eq. 17), then it is straightforward to show that the
limit r¯ always exists and takes the value a. Consequently
the decision criterion (Eq. 7) is equivalent to the optimi-
sation of r¯, the time-average growth rate. The process
x(t) may be chosen such that (Eq. 17) does not apply
for any choice of u(x). In this case we cannot interpret
expected utility theory dynamically, and such processes
are likely to be pathological.
This gives our central result:
For expected utility theory to be equivalent to op-
timisation over time, utility must follow an additive
stochastic process with stationary increments which,
in our framework, we shall take to be a Brownian
motion with drift.
This is a fascinating general connection. If the phys-
ical reason why we observe non-linear utility functions
is the non-linear effect of fluctuations over time, then a
given utility function encodes a corresponding stochastic
wealth process. Provided that a utility function u(x) is
invertible, i.e. provided that its inverse, x(u), exists, a
simple application of Itoˆ calculus to (Eq. 17) yields di-
rectly the SDE obeyed by the wealth, x. Thus every
invertible utility function encodes a unique dynamic in
wealth which arises from a Brownian motion in utility.
This is explored further below.
V. DYNAMIC FROM A UTILITY FUNCTION
We now illustrate the relationship between utility func-
tions and wealth dynamics. For the reasons discussed
above we assume that utility follows a Brownian motion
with drift.
If u(x) can be inverted to x(u) = u−1(u), and x(u)
is twice differentiable, then it is possible to find the
dynamic that corresponds to the utility function u(x).
Equation (17) is an Itoˆ process. Itoˆ’s lemma tells us that
dx will be another Itoˆ process, and Itoˆ’s formula specifies
how to find dx in terms of the relevant partial derivatives
dx =
(
∂x
∂t
+ au
∂x
∂u
+
1
2
b2u
∂2x
∂u2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ax(x)
dt+ bu
∂x
∂u︸ ︷︷ ︸
bx(x)
dW (18)
We have thus shown that
Theorem 1. For any invertible utility function u(x) a
class of corresponding wealth processes dx can be obtained
such that the (linear) rate of change in the expectation
value of net changes in utility is the time-average growth
rate of wealth.
As a consequence, optimizing expected changes in such
utility functions is equivalent to optimizing the time-
average growth, in the sense of Section IV, under the
corresponding wealth process.
The origin of optimizing expected utility can be un-
derstood as follows: in the 18th century, the distinction
between ergodic and non-ergodic processes was unknown,
and all stochastic processes were treated by computing
expectation values. Since the expectation value of the
wealth process is an irrelevant mathematical object to
an individual whose wealth is modelled by a non-ergodic
process the available methods failed. The formalism was
saved by introducing a non-linear mapping of wealth,
namely the utility function. The (failed) expectation
value criterion was interpreted as theoretically optimal,
and the non-linear utility functions were interpreted as
a psychologically motivated pattern of human behavior.
Conceptually, this is wrong.
Optimization of time-average growth recognizes the
non-ergodicity of the situation and computes the appro-
priate object from the outset – a procedure whose build-
ing blocks were developed beginning in the late 19th cen-
tury. It does not assume anything about human psychol-
ogy and indeed predicts that the same behavior will be
observed in any growth-optimizing entities that need not
be human.
A. Examples
Equation (18), creates pairs of utility functions u(x)
and dynamics dx. In discrete time, two such pairs were
investigated in [1], namely cases 1. and 2. below.
71. Linear utility
The trivial linear utility function corresponds to addi-
tive wealth dynamics (Brownian motion),
u(x) = x ↔ dx = audt+ budW. (19)
2. Logarithmic utility
Introduced by Bernoulli in 1738 [11], the logarithmic
utility function is in wide use and corresponds to multi-
plicative wealth dynamics (geometric Brownian motion),
u(x) = ln(x) ↔ dx = x
[(
au +
1
2
b2u
)
dt+ budW
]
.
(20)
In practice the most useful case will be multiplicative
wealth dynamics. But to demonstrate the generality of
the procedure, we carry it out for a different special case
that is historically important.
3. Square-root (Cramer) utility
The first utility function ever to be suggested was the
square-root function u(x) = x1/2, by Cramer in a 1728
letter to Daniel Bernoulli, partially reproduced in [11].
This function is invertible, namely x(u) = u2, so that
(Eq. 18) applies. We note that the square root, in a spe-
cific sense, sits between the linear function and the log-
arithm: limx→∞ x
1/2
x = 0 and limx→∞
ln(x)
x1/2
= 0. Since
linear utility produces additive dynamics and logarith-
mic utility produces multiplicative dynamics, we expect
square-root utility to produce something in between or
some mix. Substituting for x(u) in (Eq. 18) and carrying
out the differentiations we find
u(x) = x1/2 ↔ dx =
(
2aux
1/2 + b2u
)
dt+2bux
1/2dW.
(21)
The drift term contains a multiplicative element (by
which we mean an element with x-dependence) and an
additive element. We see that the square-root utility
function that lies between the logarithm and the linear
function indeed represents a dynamic that is partly ad-
ditive and partly multiplicative.
(Eq. 21) is reminiscent of the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross model
[12] in financial mathematics, especially if au < 0. Simi-
lar dynamics, i.e. with a noise amplitude that is propor-
tional to
√
x, are also studied in the context of absorbing-
state phase transitions in statistical physics [13, 14].
That a 300-year-old letter is related to recent work in
statistical mechanics is not surprising: the problems that
motivated the development of decision theory, and indeed
of probability theory itself are far-from equilibrium pro-
cesses. Methods to study such processes were only de-
veloped in the 20th century and constitute much of the
work currently carried out in statistical mechanics.
VI. UTILITY FUNCTION FROM A DYNAMIC
We now ask under what circumstances the procedure
in (Eq. 18) can be inverted. When can a utility func-
tion be found for a given dynamic? In other words, what
conditions does the dynamic dx have to satisfy so that
optimization over time can be represented by optimiza-
tion of expected net changes in utility u(x)?
We ask whether a given dynamic can be mapped into
a utility whose increments are described by Brownian
motion, (Eq. 17).
The dynamic is an arbitrary Itoˆ process
dx = ax(x)dt+ bx(x)dW, (22)
where ax(x) and bx(x) are arbitrary functions of x. For
this dynamic to translate into a Brownian motion for the
utility, u(x) must satisfy the equivalent of (Eq. 18) with
the special requirement that the coefficients au and bu in
(Eq. 17) be constants, namely
du =
(
ax(x)
∂u
∂x
+
1
2
b2x(x)
∂2u
∂x2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
au
dt+ bx(x)
∂u
∂x︸ ︷︷ ︸
bu
dW. (23)
Explicitly, we arrive at two equations for the coefficients
au = ax(x)u
′ +
1
2
b2x(x)u
′′ (24)
and
bu = bx(x)u
′. (25)
Differentiating (Eq. 25), it follows that
u′′(x) = −bub
′
x(x)
b2x(x)
. (26)
Substituting in (Eq. 24) for u′ and u′′ and solving for
ax(x) we find the drift term as a function of the noise
term,
ax(x) =
au
bu
bx(x) +
1
2
bx(x)b
′
x(x). (27)
In other words, knowledge of only the dynamic is suffi-
cient to determine whether a corresponding utility func-
tion exists. We do not need to construct the utility func-
tion explicitly to know whether a pair of drift term and
noise term is consistent or not.
Having determined for some dynamic that a consistent
utility function exists, we can construct it by substituting
for bx(x) in (Eq. 24). This yields a differential equation
for u
au = ax(x)u
′ +
b2u
2u′2
u′′ (28)
or
0 = −auu′2 + ax(x)u′3 + b
2
u
2
u′′. (29)
8Overall, then the triplet noise term, drift term, utility
function is interdependent. Given a noise term we can
find consistent drift terms, and given a drift term we
find a consistency condition (differential equation) for the
utility function.
A. Example
Given a dynamic, it is possible to check whether this
dynamic can be mapped into a utility function, and the
utility function itself can be found. We consider the fol-
lowing example
dx =
(
au
bu
e−x − 1
2
e−2x
)
dt+ e−xdW. (30)
We note that ax(x) =
au
bu
e−x − 12e−2x and bx(x) = e−x.
Equation (27) imposes conditions on the drift term ax(x)
in terms of the noise term bx(x). Substituting in (Eq. 27)
reveals that the consistency condition is satisfied by the
dynamic in (Eq. 30).
A typical trajectory of (Eq. 30) is shown in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 1: Typical trajectories of the wealth trajectory x(t) de-
scribed by (Eq. 30), with parameter values au = 1/2 and
bu = 1, and the corresponding Brownian motion u(t). Note
that the fluctuations in x(t) become smaller for larger wealth.
Because (Eq. 30) is internally consistent, it is possi-
ble to derive the corresponding utility function. Equa-
tion (25) is a first-order ordinary differential equation for
u(x)
u′(x) =
bu
bx(x)
, (31)
which can be integrated to
u(x) =
∫ x
0
dx˜
bu
bx(x˜)
+ C, (32)
with C an arbitrary constant of integration. This con-
stant corresponds to the fact that only changes in utility
are meaningful, as was pointed out by von Neumann and
Morgenstern [15] – this robust feature is visible whether
one thinks in dynamic terms and time averages or in
terms of consistent measure-theoretic concepts and ex-
pectation values.
Substituting for bx(x) from (Eq. 30), (Eq. 31) becomes
u′(x) = buex, (33)
which is easily integrated to
u(x) = bue
x + C, (34)
plotted in Fig. 2. This expoential utility function is
monotonic and therefore invertible, which is reflected
in the fact that the consistency condition is satisfied.
The utility function is convex. From the perspective
of expected-utility theory an individual behaving opti-
mally according to this function would be labelled “risk-
seeking.” The dynamical perspective corresponds to a
qualitatively different interpretation: Under the dynamic
(Eq. 30) the “risk-seeking” individual behaves optimally,
in the sense that his wealth will grow faster than that
of a risk-averse individual. The dynamic (Eq. 30) has
the feature that fluctuations in wealth become smaller as
wealth grows. High wealth is therefore sticky – an indi-
vidual will quickly fluctuate out of low wealth and into
higher wealth. It will then tend to stay there.
VII. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION FROM A
DYNAMIC
The dynamical interpretation of expected utility the-
ory makes it particularly simple to compute wealth dis-
tributions. A utility function u(x) implies a dynamic
x(t), and that dynamic generates a wealth distribution
Px(x, t). We know that u(t) follows a simple Brownian
motion, wherefore we know that u(t) is normally dis-
tributed according to
Pu(u, t) = N
(
aut, b
2
ut
2
)
. (35)
Since we know Pu(u, t), the distribution of x is easily
derived. The wealth distribution in a large population,
is
Px(x, t) = Pu(u(x), t)
du
dx
. (36)
A. Example of a wealth distribution
The utility function (Eq. 34) corresponds to the exam-
ple dynamic (Eq. 30). The wealth distribution at any
time t can be read off (Eq. 36)
Px(x, t) =
1√
2pib2ut
2
exp
(
− (bue
x + C − aut)2√
2b2ut
2
)
bue
x,
(37)
9which is shown in Fig. 3. The distribution is sensible
given what we know about the dynamic – since fluctu-
ations diminish with increasing wealth many individuals
will be found at high wealth (all those that have fluctu-
ated away from low wealth), with a heavy tail towards
lower wealth.
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FIG. 2: Utility function of (Eq. 34), with bu = 1 and C = 0.
Optimizing the expected change in this utility function also
optimizes time-average growth under the corresponding dy-
namic (Eq. 30). An unusual utility function – like the convex
function shown here – reflects unusual dynamics, see text.
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FIG. 3: Probability density function of wealth, also known as
the wealth distribution, (Eq. 37). This distribution is gener-
ated by the wealth dynamic (Eq. 30). The time is fixed to
t = 5, and we use au = 1/2, bu = 1, and C = 0.
VIII. UNBOUNDEDNESS OF u(x)
The scheme outlined in Section VI is informative for
the debate regarding the boundedness of utility func-
tions. A well-established but false belief in the economics
literature, due to Karl Menger [16, 17], is that permissi-
ble utility functions must be bounded. We have argued
previously that boundedness is an unnecessary restric-
tion, and that Menger’s arguments are not valid [1, 3].
Section VI implies that the interpretation of expected
utility theory we offer here formally requires unbound-
edness of utility functions. Bounded functions are not
invertible, and Menger’s incorrect result therefore con-
tributed to obscuring the simple natural arguments we
present here.
Of course whether u(x) is bounded or not is practically
irrelevant because x will always be finite. However, for
a clean mathematical formalism an unbounded u(x) is
highly desirable.
The problem is easily demonstrated by considering the
case of zero noise. Since u(x) always follows a Brownian
motion in our treatment, in the zero-noise case it follows
du = audt, (38)
meaning linear growth in time. For u to be bounded,
time itself would have to be bounded. Another way to
see the problem is inverting u(x) to find x(u). If we
require simultaneously linear growth of u(t) in time, and
boundedness from above, limx→∞ u(x) = Ub, then x(t)
has to diverge in the finite time it takes for u(t) to reach
Ub, namely in Tb =
Ub
au
(assuming for simplicity u(t =
0) = 0).
Such features – an end of time or a finite-time singu-
larity of wealth – are inconvenient to carry around in
a formalism. Since they have no physical meaning, for
simplicity a model without them should be chosen, i.e.
unbounded utility functions will be much better. We re-
peat that Menger’s arguments against unbounded utility
functions are invalid and we need not worry about them.
IX. DISCUSSION
Expected utility theory is an 18th-century patch, ap-
plied to a flawed conceptual framework established in
the 17th century that made blatantly wrong predictions
of human behavior. Because the mathematics of ran-
domness was in its infancy in the 18th century, the
conceptual problems were overlooked, and utility the-
ory set economics off in the wrong direction. Without
any of the arbitrariness inherent in utility functions it
is nowadays possible to give a physical meaning to the
non-linear mappings people seem to apply to monetary
amounts. These apparent mappings simply encode the
non-linearity of wealth dynamics.
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